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Effect of Railroad Deregulation 
on Export-Grain Transportation Rate Structures 
S. Fuller, J. MacDonald, D. Bessler, and M. Wohlgenant* 
Introduction 
The trend toward federal deregulation of the nation's 
transportation sector has been viewed with concern by 
many in the agricultural community. Of great interest is 
the recent deregulation of the railroad industry (Staggers 
Rail Act) and its effect on the competitiveness of the trans-
portation environment for bulk agricultural commodities. 
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 represen ts one of the most 
dramatic changes in federal policy toward railroads since 
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, the act responsible 
for creating the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 
The Staggers Act is based on the premise that while the 
railroad industry once constituted a monopoly, requiring 
ICC regulation , this is no longer true (Keeler). It is held 
that competition is generally adequate to constrain any 
potential abuses by railroads. The act assumes that less 
regulation and more reliance on the marketplace will give 
rise to a more efficient, financially viable rail system. 
Although the Staggers Act includes many provisions, 
some of its most extensive regulatory changes and con-
troversial features relate to rates. The legislation allows 
carriers considerable flexibility in determining rates. Cur-
rent regulation is designed to prevent rates from rising to 
monopoly levels for commodities of captive shippers and 
to limit rates from falling below variable costs. Maximum 
rates are identified through specified revenue to variable 
cost ratios but apply only if the railroad is earning an 
"adequate" return on investment (Keeler). In addition, in-
dependent railroad pricing has been encouraged by provi-
sions that reduce the time required for a particular rail-
road's proposed rate adjustment to become effective and 
by requiring one objecting to a railroad's proposed rate to 
offer proof of its inappropriateness. Further, Section 208 
of the Staggers Act permits carriers and shippers to enter 
into private contracts. Contracts generally commit the 
grain shipper to some minimum shipment size and vol-
ume while the railroad provides service at below tariff 
rates. Contracting allows railroads to offer shippers incen-
tives to adopt practices and schedules that subsequently 
enhance railroad efficiency and , in so doing, permits the 
railroad to offer reduced rates to a particular shipper with-
out fear of violating the historical statutes regarding per-
sonal price discrimination. An equally important feature 
of the new act reduces the freedom of carriers to collabo-
rate on rates through rate bureaus. Rate bureaus are gov-
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ernment-sanctioned associations that historically permit-
ted carriers to collaborate on rates. With passage of the 
Staggers Act, only carriers involved in providing service 
on interline hauls may jointly set rates for that haul. Thus, 
the role of rate bureaus has been dramatically reduced. 
Some agricultural interests question the workability of 
the competitive transportation environment, even with 
the precautionary provisions of the Staggers Act . They 
argue that some surplus-grain producing regions are 
served by few rail carriers and, in some cases, have lim-
ited alternatives to ship via competing modes. The Plains 
is often cited as an example; this region is served by a 
small number of competing rail firms, there is ineffective 
barge competition because of few navigable rivers, and 
since many of the Plains' grain markets are at extended 
distances, the motor vehicle's cost structure limits its ef-
fectiveness as a competitor (Fruin , Koo). Further, ship-
pers in the South and Central Plains may be vulnerable 
because of their heavy dependence on a single market, 
the export market, and the one major transportation cor-
ridor (Plains-Gulf port corridor) that links the region to 
this market. More effective transportation competiti01 
would exist if the region depended on spatially separate 
markets that were linked to the supply region by several 
carriers. The Corn Belt, in contrast to the Plains, seems 
to be in a more competitive transportation market. Much 
of the region is close to effective barge competition, and 
there are many market outlets and competing transporta-
tion corridors over which grain may move. Therefore, the 
effect of deregulation may be quite different in the Corn 
Belt and the Plains regions. 
Predicting the outcome of deregulation is complicated 
by conflicting notions regarding the regulator's behavior 
during the pre-Staggers era. Historically, it was thought 
that the ICC tended to follow the value-of-service pricing 
theory, (i. e., rates for low-valued bulky commodities like 
grain were set at low levels while higher-valued manufac-
tured goods bore relatively high rates) (Posner; Meyer, 
Peck, Stenason, and Zwick). There is an alternative no-
tion that over time the ICC abandoned the value-of-service 
pricing scheme because of increasing competition from 
motor carriers in the high-valued products transportation 
markets. A study by Sorenson, Anderson , and Nelson in 
the early 1970s refuted the view that ICC policy favore 1 
agriculture. In fact, much of the rail grain rate structu} 
seemed to be put in place by a discriminating 
monopolist-Corn Belt rates exhibited relatively low re-
venue-to-variable cost ratios while wheat rates in the 
Plains were characterized by large ratios. This finding and 
others seem to question the notion that value-of- servic( 
pricing was the basis for grain rate structures during th 
period preceding deregulation (Friedlaender and Spady; 
Fuller, Makus, and Taylor; Spann and Erickson). 
If ICC policy did subsidize agriculture through low rail 
rates, then the Staggers Act may cause rail rates to rise 
sharply in those regions where intermodal competition is 
limited and deregulation does not facilitate interrailroad 
competition. However, if the ICC allowed railroads to act 
as a cartel, the pre-Staggers rail rates may be near the 
maximum allowed by intermodal competition. And, if the 
Staggers Act failed to generate interrailroad competition, 
hen deregulation may not substantially alter rates. Con-
versely, if the Staggers Act succeeds in promoting inter-
rail competition, rates may decline. 
Economists have contributed to an extensive body of 
literature that identifies the considerable inefficiencies 
and costs generated by ICC regulation, but limited efforts 
have been made to extrapolate the likely consequences of 
deregulation. Most noteworthy among efforts that at-
tempt to evaluate the likely effect of deregulation are 
those by Friedlaender and Levin. Friedlaender notes that 
the effect of deregulation with regard to bulk agricultural 
commodities is difficult to predict but speculates that ef-
fective rate competition among railroads is remote, even 
in the absence of rate bureaus. Furthermore, Friedlaen-
der observes that under pre-Staggers regulation, rail-
roads were able to exploit a considerable amount of their 
monopoly power on bulk agricultural commodities. In 
view of the ineffective rate competition expected by 
Friedlaender in the deregulated environment, and be-
cause of the railroads' ability to generate maximum rates 
on noncompetitive traffic before deregulation, Friedlaen-
der concludes that railroads have little untapped 
monopoly power on noncompetitive agricultural traffic. 
Thus , rate deregulation most likely would not lead to sub-
stantial or general rate increases in noncompetitive trans-
portation environments. 
Levin simulated the deregulation outcome under vari-
ous assumptions concerning elasticity of rail demand, de-
gree of interrailroad competition, magnitude of rail cost 
reduction attainable with enhanced commercial freedom , 
and various levels of truck competition. Levin shows the 
social desirability of the deregulation outcome is closely 
related to the degree of interrailroad competition. Rail-
roads' rate of return and welfare losses vary only moder-
ately with reductions in rail and truck costs, but a modest 
degree of interrailroad competition has a profound effect. 
Levin indicates grain transportation markets are probably 
most accurately represented by an intermediate degree of 
railroad competition; therefore, grain rates are unlikely to 
increase much in a deregulated environment. 
The theoretical expectations regarding the effect of de-
regulation are uncertain , but empirical evidence is in-
creasing. Unfortunately, there are several problems as-
sociated with measuring the effect of deregulation on rate 
vels. Because m~ch of the rail-transported grain moves 
under confidential contracts , the published tariffs provide 
incomplete information, (i.e., accurate rate information is 
not accessible). Further, coincident events make it dif-
ficult to segregate the effect of deregulation from other 
happenings. As an example , grain exports have declined 
nearly 50 percent from the peak years in 1980-1981, and 
presumably this has led to declines in the demand for 
transportation and a downward pressure on rates. Clearly, 
a method that controls for these effects is necessary to ac-
curately measure the impact of deregulation. 
Despite problems associated with the empirical 
analysis of deregulation , useful evidence has been col-
lected. Several Kansas studies attempted to measure and 
contrast rate trends during the pre- and post-Staggers era 
(Babcock et al.; Klindworth et al; and Sorenson) . They re-
port that published rail rates between 14 Kansas elevator 
sites and Gulf ports increased an average of38 .9 cents per 
bushel in the 4 years preceding the Staggers Act and de-
clined 37 cents between 1981 and 1984. Price spreads 
were found to closely follow rail rates during the 8-year 
study period. Adam and Anderson investigated corn and 
soybean price spreads for a sample of Nebraska elevators 
from September 1978 through August 1984. They con-
clude price spreads declined in the post-Staggers period 
by large and statistically significant amounts. The Kansas 
and Nebraska studies imply similar impacts attributable 
to deregulation. 
This study attempts to measure the impact of rail dere-
gulation on export rates that link Plains and Corn Belt re-
gions with their respective port areas in order to learn 
more about the effect of the deregulated environment on 
railroad price structures. An effort is made to evaluate the 
effect of deregulation on rates by analyzing the price 
spread between port and selected hinterland regions from 
1976 through 1985. The decision to focus on geographic 
price spreads was prompted by knowledge that many 
export-grain rail rates in the post-Staggers era are deter-
mined through private negotiations and are not public in-
formation. In this case , direct measurement of rates to 
identify the effect of deregulation would be difficult or im-
possible. By controlling for changes in export demand, 
local supply, and costs of transportation, storage , and 
marketing services , an attempt is made to isolate the ef-
fect of deregulation on rates. It is assumed that the grain-
handling industry is sufficiently competitive for geo-
graphic price spreads to reflect changes in transportation 
rates that may result from railroad deregulation. 
This report includes five additional sections. First, at-
tention is given to describing the selected study regions 
and their historic grain transportation patterns. This is fol-
lowed by a section outlining the conceptual model that di-
rects the analysis and a statistical model designed to i~o­
late the effect of deregulation on rates. The results section 
focuses on that portion of the statistical model that 
analyzes the effect of deregulation and elaborates on sec-
ondary issues associated with deregulation. The study 
findings are subsequently discussed in view of the pre-
Staggers notions about deregulation and the ICC's appar-
ent regulatory philosophy. Finally, conclusions and re-
commendations are offered. 
Marketing of Grain in Study Regions 
The study area was made up of subregions comprising 
the entire states of Kansas , Iowa, and Indiana as well as 
the Texas Panhandle and portions of Illinois. Kansas and 
the Texas Panhandle subregions constitute one study 
area. These Plains subregions are surplus producers of 
hard red winter wheat, a wheat class that has historically 
comprised about half of the United States' annual wheat 
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production. Principal hard red winter wheat producers 
are Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Colorado, Nebraska and 
several northern Plains states. 
USDA data show about 60 percent of the United States' 
hard red winter wheat production is typically exported . A 
1977 study by Leath, Hill, and Fuller showed the Texas 
regions exported from 60 percent to 81 percent of their 
wheat shipments while Kansas regions exported slightly 
more than half of their shipments. Gulf ports receive 
more than 99 percent of the Kansas and Texas regions' ex-
port shipments with the Houston-Galveston-Beaumont 
complex being the principal export location. All study re-
gions rely heavily on rail transportation-about 90 per-
cent of the western Kansas wheat outflow was carried by 
rail, whereas, northeast Kansas and the Texas Panhandle 
shipped about 75 percent by rail, the lowest share shipped 
by any region. 
The corn study region includes areas of Iowa, Illinois, 
and Indiana. These states have historically produced 
nearly 50 percent of the United States' annual corn pro-
duction with Illinois and Iowa each typically producing 
1.0 billion to 1.7 billion bu., while Indiana's annual pro-
duction ranges between 0.4 and 0.7 billion bu. About 30 
percent of the United States' annual corn production typ-
ically moves to export markets. A 1977 study shows the Conl 
Belt study regions ship to alternative export locations (Hill, 
Leath, and Fuller). All study region states shipped export 
grain to at least three of the four export coastal areas 
(Great Lakes, Atlantic, Gulf, Pacific); however, for Illinois 
and Iowa, the majority of export shipments (88 percent-90 
percent) were to Gulf ports, principally Mississippi River 
ports. In contrast, Indiana shipped about 75 percent of its 
corn exports to Atlantic ports. In 1977, Iowa and Illinois 
shipped up to 90 percent of their Gulf shipments by barge 
while all of Indiana's corn movement to Atlantic ports 
were transported by rail. 
Conceptual and Statistical Model 
The following conceptual model is used to direct the 
analyses. Price relationships in major transportation cor-
ridors are assumed to be determined under the derived 
demand framework depicted in Figure 1. In this analyti-
cal framework, the grain price spread between aU. S. port 
and some hinterland producing region is determined by 
the interaction of the export grain demand curve at the 
port (Og), the farm-level supply function (Si), the demand 
for export marketing services derived from these two 
schedules (Om), and the supply of marketing services on 
the corridor that links the hinterland and the port (SnJ 
The price spread (m) is the price difference, P g-Pi, where 
P g is the grain price at a port (e.g., a Gulf port, and Pi is 
the price at an interior location, such as an Illinois produc-
ing region. Other things being equal, an increase in ex-
port demand (O~, and farm-level supply (SJ or a decline 
in the supply ot marketing services (Om) will tend to 
widen the price spread. 
Two regression models are estimated to measure the ef-
fect of deregulation; one model attempts to capture the ef-
fect of deregulation on price spreads (m) and rates in the 
Plains region (surplus wheat-producing regions) while the 
second model focuses on the Corn Belt. The Plains or 
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Figure 1. Model of grain transportation corri-
dor's price spread. 
wheat model includes, as the dependent variable, the 
monthly time series data on price spreads (1976-1985) be-
tween 12 hinterland regions in Texas and Kansas and 
Texas Gulf ports, while the corn model includes monthly 
price spreads between 18 hinterland regions in Iowa, Il-
linois, and Indiana and Gulf and/or Atlantic coast ports. 
In general, the adopted procedure involves estimating 
regression equations with price spreads as the dependent 
variable . The independent variables include: (1) controls fOJ 
shifts in the above-noted demand and supply schedule 
(Figure 1), (2) region and time dummies, and (3) a dummy 
and an interaction term to isolate changes in price spreads 
that may have resulted from the 1980 deregulation. 
Monthly price spread observations are generated for 
each hinterland region over a multiyear period, thus pool-
ing both cross-section and time-series data. It seemed un-
reasonable to assume that the ordinary least-squares esti-
mates of the intercept and slope would be constant for all 
hinterland regions across all time periods. Thus, dummy 
variables that allow the intercept term to vary over time 
and over regions were introduced. The region dummies 
attempt to control for cross-region price spread determi-
nants not formally incorporated in the model. 
The study focuses on isolating the effect of deregulation 
through analysis of price spreads. To accomplish this, a de-
regulation dummy was introduced. This binary variable 
estimates the adjustment in the regression equation's in-
tercept that is associated with deregulation. The deregula-
tion dummy is also used interactively with the time trend 
variable to generate an additional variable whose estimated 
coefficient relates changes in the slope of the time tren,l 
variable that may have occurred because of deregulation. 
The general model estimated to determine the effect of 
deregulation on geographic price spreads is as follows: 
(1) Pit = a + ~lOit + ~~Sit + ~3MSit + region dummies 
+ time dummies + deregulation dummy + deregula-
tion dummy x trend time + Uit 
where, Pit is the monthly average price spread between 
hinterland regions and ports in dollarslbushel; 0it repre-
sents export demand shifters; Sit represents farm-level 
supply shifters; MS it represents marketing service supply 
shifters; and Uit are the unexplained residuals. Subscripts 
i and t refer to regions and time periods, respectively. 
The dependent variable is the monthly price spread 
(dollarslbushels) between each hinterland study region 
and its associated port area for the 120-month period 
(1976-1985). Figure 2 shows this time-series profile for the 
est-central Kansas study region. In general, all of the 
wheat regions' price spreads tend to widen through 1980 
and then begin to narrow. 
Several types of variables were identified as potential 
shifters of export demand, farm-level grain supply, and 
marketing services supply. National export levels and in-
ternational grain prices were considered as potential mea-
sures of export demand. However, because of the lag be-
tween the grain sale and its subsequent outflow, the quan-
tity exported per month was predetermined with respect 
to the current month's price. Thus , quantity, rather than 
price, was assumed to be the outside factor. Furthermore, 
including the international grain price (e .g. , Rotterdam 
price) as a demand shifter may have created a spurious re-
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gression problem (i.e., the error term may not have been 
independent of the explanatory variable). For these 
reasons , monthly national exports was selected as the ap-
propriate proxy for export demand (Figure 3) (USDA, 
1976-1985a). It was assumed that port area demand was 
closely related to the national export level. 
Several variables were tentatively selected as a proxy for 
the farm-level supply function. An effort was made to col-
lect annual grain supply for each hinterland study region, 
but for several states, the production and price data were 
not available for similar geographic units. It was assumed 
that the quantity of produced grain was predetermined, 
so, as an alternative, state-level and national grain supply 
data were the selected variables (USDA, 1976-1985b; 
USDA, 1976-1985c). 
During the study period, there were substantial changes 
in factor prices, and these changes may have affected 
spreads between hinterland farm-level prices and port 
area export prices. For purposes of this analysis, real costs 
of holding grain are represented by the difference be-
tween the nominal interest rate (Figure 4) and the percent 
change in the wholesale price index (International Mone-
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Figure 2. Monthly west-central Kansas wheat price spread, 1976-1985.1 
1 Price spread is estimated by subtracting the monthly average west-central Kansas farm-level wheat price from the monthly aver-
age Houston export wheat price. 
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Figure 3. Monthly u.s. hard red winter wheat exports, 1976-1985. 
tary Fund). It was thought that a simultaneity problem 
would arise if the percent change in grain value were sub-
stituted for the wholesale price index. 
Because changes in real wage rates may alter the price 
spread, an index of wages was included (Figure 5) (Inter-
national Monetary Fund). In addition, an index of fuel 
prices was included as a potential shifter since these 
prices changed dramatically during the study period (Fig-
ure 6) (Association of American Railroads, 1979-1986). 
Any real increase in wages or fuel prices would have 
shifted the farm-level ~nd the marketing services supply 
function. In the case of the farm-level supply function, an 
increase in input values will tend to narrow the price 
spread; in contrast, increasing input prices will tend to 
shift the marketing services supply function to the left and 
increase the price spread. In this case, increasing input 
prices may create off-setting effects on the price spread 
and make it impossible to predict signs. However, for pur-
poses of this study, this outcome does not represent a 
problem since interest is only in controlling for such ef-
fects. To measure the potential effect of changing rail costs 
on rates and the subsequent impact on price spreads, two 
rail cost indices were selected. Both indices were gener-
ated by the Association of American Railroads (Associa-
6 
tion of American Railroads, 1979-1986). One index mea-
sures materials prices and wages, whereas the other in-
cludes fuel, material prices, and wages (Figure 7). 
A rail utilization index was constructed from the AAR's 
Rail Grain Traffic by Quarter and Rail Grain Fleet Data 
(Association of American Railroads, 1987). The numerator 
of the index includes quantity of grain rail-transported per 
unit of time, and the denominator reflects the railroad's 
car supply or its grain-carrying capacity (Figure 8). Dur-
ing a 10-year study period, the index exhibited an intra-
year cycle except in 1981-82. The low and relatively con-
stant rail utilization index in 1981-82 was the result of an 
increase in fleet capacity that peaked in January 1982 and 
declining rail grain traffic. Based on the AAR data, the 
one-time rail carrying capacity peaked at 845 million bu 
in January 1982, while the 1981 and 1982 rail-carried grai 
volume declined 12 percent and 16 percent relative to 
1980. A dramatic reduction in 40-ft boxcars during 1982, 
coupled with modest increases in grain traffic in 1983, 
reestablished the historical movement in the rail car utili-
zation index. 
To reflect a widening price spread that may be attribut-
able to shortages in hinterland storage capacity, a ratio 
variable that measures unused storage capacity relative to 
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Figure 4. Monthly 3-month T-biU rates, 1976-1985. 
total storage capacity was constructed (USDA, 1976-
1985d). Because limited data was available, it was neces-
sary to estimate the ratio on a statewide basis. The ratio, 
calculated using grain stock and storage capacity data, 
exhibits the expected intra-year pattern (Figure 9). 
Because the corn and wheat surplus study regions have 
different marketing and transportation characteristics , 
several of the proposed explanatory variables were 
unique to each model. Some study regions in the Corn 
Belt ship grain to both Atlantic and Gulf ports, in which 
case it was necessary to include price spreads based on 
both port areas. To account for potential differences in 
price spreads that were due to coastal port area destina-
tion, a dummy variable was added to capture any "cross-
coast" variation in price spread. In addition, export barge 
ates on the Illinois and Mississippi River system were in-
cluded in the Corn Belt model (Illinois Department of Ag-
riculture). The barge mode is the principal carrier of corn 
from Iowa and Illinois to Gulf ports and is a major com-
petitor of the railroad industry (Figure 10). See Table 1 for 
definition of variables included in the analysis (Appendix 
A). 
Results 
Two regression models are estimated to measure the ef-
fect of deregulation; one model attempts to capture the ef-
fect of deregulation on price spreads and rates in the 
Plains region, while the second focuses on the Corn Belt. 
The Plains model includes, as the dependent variable, the 
monthly time series data on wheat price spreads (1976-
1985) between 12 hinterland regions in Texas and Kansas 
and Texas Gulf ports, while the Corn Belt model includes 
monthly corn price spreads between 18 hinterland re-
gions in Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana and Gulf and/or Atlan-
tic Coast ports. 
Parameter estimates for the Plains and Corn Belt 
covariance models are presented in Table 2.1 The signs 
IThe Durbin-Watson statistics showed the residuals of the 
Plains and Corn Belt models to be serially correlated; there-
fore, both models were reestimated and corrected for au-
tocorrelation. The first-order serial correlation coefficient for 
the Plains model had an estimated value of 0.466 with a 
standard error of 0.023. The Corn Belt model's serial correla-
tion coefficient had a value of 0.356 with a standard error of 
0.019. The adjusted R-squared for the Plains and Corn Belt 
models were .60 and .66, respectively. 
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Table 1. Definition of Variables Included in Regression 
Equations 
PSPD: Monthly hard red winter wheat or corn 
price spread between port location and 
hinterland study region ($ bu, 1975 = 
100) 
EXPD: Monthly U.S. hard red winter wheat or 
corn exports (1,000 bu) 
FSUP: Annual region hard red winter wheat or 
corn production (1 million bu) 
WAGE: Monthly real wage rate index (1975 
100) 
T-BILL: Monthly 3-month T-bill rate 
EXPECT: Monthly percent change in wholesale 
price index 
RUt: Monthly rail equipment utilization index 
STOR: Monthly ratio of unused storage capacity 
to total storage capacity in study region 
TIME: Monthly time trend variable 
DINTER: Variable to measure changes in intercept 
due to rail deregulation (pre-Staggers = 
0, post-Staggers = 1) 
DSLOPE: Variable to measure change in TIME vari-
able's slope due to rail deregulation 
(DINTER X TIME) 
BRAT: Monthly real barge rates linking mid-
Illinois River with Gulf ports' locations 
($/bu, 1975 = 100) 
COAST: Variable in Corn Belt model to measure 
effect of port location on price spread 
(Gulf ports = 0, Atlantic ports = 1) 
JAN-NOV: Month dummies 
TXTRI: Region dummy for Texas Triangle region 
TXNOC: Region dummy for Texas Canadian River 
region 
TXSOL: Region dummy for Texas M uleshoe-Plain-
view region 
KSNW-KSSE: Region dummies for Kansas regions. Last 
two letters identify geographic location 
of region in state. 
IDNW-IDSE: Region dummies for Indiana regions. 
Last two letters identify geographic loca-
tion in state. 
IANW-IASE: Region dummies for Iowa regions. Last 
two letters identify geographic location 
in state. 
ILW-ILNC: Region dummies for Illinois regions. Last 
two letters identify geographic location 
in state. 
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Table 2. Estimated Linear Regression Coefficients for 
the Plains and Corn Belt Covariance Modell 
Variable 
INTERCEPT 
EXPO 
FSUP 
WAGE 
T-BILL 
EXPECT 
RUI 
STOR 
TIME 
OINTER 
OSLOPE 
BRAT 
COAST 
JAN 
FEB 
MAR 
APR 
MAY 
TUN 
JUL 
AUG 
SEP 
OCT 
NOV 
TXTRI 
TXNOC 
TXSOL 
KSNW 
KSWC 
KSSW 
KSNC 
KSC 
KSSC 
KSNE 
KSEC 
IONW 
IONC 
lONE 
IOWC 
IOC 
IOEC 
IOSW 
IOSC 
lOSE 
IANW 
IANC 
lANE 
IASW 
IASC 
lASE 
ILW 
ILNC 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
N 
Plains model Corn Belt model 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
-0.1182 
6.5937-07 
0.00016 
0.0053 
0.0001 
0.0036 
-0.0254 
-0.0936 
0.0015 
0.2487 
-0.0056 
-0.0036 
-0.0154 
-0.0067 
-0.0196 
-0.0201 
-0.0381 
-0.0265 
-0.0004 
-0.0181 
-0.0214 
-0.0095 
0.013 
0.0387 
0.0363 
0.1172 
0.0945 
0.0682 
0.0237 
0.0086 
-0.0026 
-0.0806 
-0.0264 
0.6017 
1440 
-0.829 
6.067 
5.220 
4.662 
0.100 
2.504 
-1.457 
-3.559 
5,452 
8.207 
-12.535 
-0.749 
-2.565 
-1.012 
-2.586 
-2.567 
-4.716 
-3.130 
-0.015 
-2.725 
-3.675 
-1.992 
1.238 
3.675 
3.450 
11.506 
9.283 
6.693 
2.329 
0.850 
-0.254 
-7.918 
-2.606 
-0.0007 
D6624-7 
-3~8867-6 
0.0026 
-0.0010 
-0.0011 
0.0219 
-0.0743 
-0.0014 
0.0065 
-0.00013 
0.5096 
-0.0149 
-0.0005 
0.0198 
0.0020 
-0.0141 
-0.0188 
-0.0253 
-0.0276 
-0.0269 
-0.0172 
0.0396 
0.0344 
0.0051 
0.0047 
-0.0627 
0.0250 
0.0073 
-0.0058 
0.0420 
0.0417 
-0.0040 
0.1248 
0.1064 
0.0870 
0.1101 
0.0902 
0.0357 
0.0206 
-0.0023 
0.6557 
2520 
-0.009 
3.730 
-0.46 
3.622 
-1.048 
-0.922 
1.462 
-3.040 
-6.780 
0.271 
-0.361 
16.833 
-2.732 
-0.089 
3.740 
0.382 
-2.368 
-3.443 
--4.023 
-3.807 
-3.395 
-2.018 
4.486 
6.376 
0.519 
0.486 
-6.415 
2.560 
0.745 
-0.591 
4.305 
4.272 
-0.405 
14.399 
12.258 
10.015 
12.684 
10.391 
4.110 
3.093 
-0.353 
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Figure 5. Monthly U. S. wage index, 1976-1985. 
and magnitudes of the estimated parameters appear 
plausible given the outlined theoretical framework. 2 See 
Appendix A for the mean, minimum , and maximum 
values of variables that appear in regressions and the sim-
ple correlation among variables . 
The effect of rail deregulation on rates is measured with 
the deregulation dummy (DINTER) and the interaction 
term (DSLOPE) that was created by interacting the time 
trend variable with DINTER. Both variables are highly 
significant in the Plains model but not significant at usual 
levels in the Corn Belt model. The outcome suggests that 
deregulation generated rate declines in the Plains but not 
in the Corn Belt. The Plains model rate trend during the 
2Various models that included non-linear forms and lagged 
variables were estimated. In general , the linear form proved 
best and lagged variables were not often significant . The ex-
ception was the wheat model where one-month lag in de-
mand (EXPD), rail utilization index (RUI), and storage 
(STOR) were significant. However, it was judged that the 
modest improvement did not warrant inclusion in the final 
model. 
pre-Staggers months (1-60) is calculated with the INTER-
CEPT coefficient ($- .1182) and the TIME coefficient 
($.0015), which is multipled by month . The post-Staggers 
trend (months 61- 120) is estimated by aggregating the 
DINTER coefficient ($.2488) with the INTERCEPTcoef-
ficient and the DSLOPE coefficient ($- .0056) with the 
TIME coefficient . The estimated coefficients on the 
TIME , DINTER, and DSLOPE variables in the Plains 
model were generally unaffected by adding variables to 
the model or deleting them , suggesting the robust nature 
of the estimated coefficients . 
Figure 11 identifies the estimated rail rate trend in the 
Plains study region during the pre- and post-Staggers era. 
Real rates increased during the five-year period preced-
ing deregulation ($.0015) and then commenced a dramatic 
decline. Deregulation appears to have reduced the rail 
rate trend an average of $.0041 per bushel ($. -0056 + 
.0015) for each additional month into the deregulated 
period . During the analyzed post-Staggers period (five 
years) , the rate trend declined an average of about 33 
cents per bushel. This result closely parallels Sorenson's 
observations regarding the impact of deregulation at 
selected Kansas locations. 
9 
310 
290 
210 
250 
~ 230 
C 210 
H 
+1 (/) 190 
8 
r-I , 10 
& 150 
130 
110 
90 
10 
SO 
1111111111111111111 
1]] Ill] 1] 122222222223333333333~~~~~~1t1t1t~55555555556666666666777777777788888888B899999ggggg0000000000111 j 11111 
01231t567B90123~567B90123~567B90123~567890123~567B90 123~S67B90123~S67B90123~S67B90123IlS67B90123~S57890123~S67B90123~S67B 
JRN'76 - DEC 'BS (rronths) 
Figure 6. Monthly fuel cost index, 1976-1985. 
The Corn Belt model shows a contrasting trend pattern 
and , in addition , indicates barge transportation rates 
(BRAT) have an important impact on Corn Belt price 
spreads. 3 The statistical insignificance (at usual levels) of 
the DINTER and DSLOPE variables show deregulation 
had little sustained effect on price spreads and trend in 
the Corn Belt. And in contrast to the Plains region find-
ings , barge rates have an extremely important effect on 
price spreads; in particular, a dollar decline in barge rates 
reduces the corn price spread about 50 cents ($.5096). 
Thus , it seems that any decline in Corn Belt price spreads 
during the post-Staggers era must have been, in large 
part, due to the decline in barge rates, not to a reduction 
in rail rates. Further analysis was carried out by including 
lagged rail and barge r:ates in the Corn Belt model to iden-
tify whether barge rates tend to affect rail rates or vice 
versa. Statistical results show barge rates affect rail rates 
in the Corn Belt but not vice versa. This is expected since 
31t was thought that simultaneity may exist between barge 
rates (BRAT) and export corn demand (EXPD). To test this 
notion, empirical tests for causality were carried out by in-
troducing lags. The analysis showed exports to be a function 
of lagged barge rates , but barge rates did not seem to be re-
lated to lagged exports . Due to the unidirectional nature of 
causality, a simultaneously determined model did not seem 
necessary. 
10 
it is generally acknowledged that water transportation has 
a substantial cost advantage for movement of low-valued 
bulky commodities , and empirical evidence verifies that 
barge carriage is dominant in those grain-surplus regions 
with access to a navigable river. 
The export demand variable in both models had a 
highly significant (1 percent level) positive impact on 
price spreads. When estimated at the means, the esti-
mated export demand elasticity for the Plains and Corn 
Belt model was .059 and .095, respectively. It follows that 
the magnitude of these elasticities is too small to account 
for the decline in price spreads that occurred during the 
1981-85 period. Local commodity production or supply 
had the expected positive impact in the Plains model but 
was not significant (at usual levels) in the Corn Belt 
model. Other statistically significant continuous variables 
included in the models were the labor cost index (WAG E) 
and the grain storage variable (STaR). Both regions' price 
spread appeared very sensitive to changing real labor 
costs (i. e. , the wage elasticity approximates unity in bot' 
models). The rail cost index was excluded from the equa-
tion because of its high correlation (.76) with the wage 
index. Price spreads in the Plains and Corn Belt transpor-
tation corridors were relatively insensitive to the availabil-
ity of storage. For both models , the estimated elasticity 
varies between -.11 and - .15. 
The interest rate (T-BILL) and rail utilization index 
(RUI) variables were not significant in either model , but 
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Figure 7. Monthly rail cost index, 1976-1985. 
the proxy for the expected change in grain price (EX-
PECT) was significant in the Plains model. The measure 
for energy prices was highly correlated (.80) with T-BILL 
and accordingly was not included in the final model. Sea-
sonality appeared to be a factor in explaining price spreads 
in the Plains and Corn Belt transportation corridors as did 
the region dummies. The region dummies account for 
cross-region variability that is unaccounted for by in-
cluded variables. The notion of no difference between 
Gulf and East Coast corn price spreads is rejected because 
of the signficance of the COAST variable - the estimated 
coefficient (-$.0149) shows corn price spreads to be 
slightly less when based on East Coast prices. 
Additional Plains Study Region Results 
There was interest in learning whether the Staggers 
Rail Act had a similar effect across all Plains study regions 
and whether the ;effects of deregulation were uniform 
over time. 4 The d~regulation dummy (DINTER) and the 
-lThe estimated models were not motivated bv a desire to 
develop structural equations; accordingly, the estimated 
parameters should be viewed as concomitants rather than 
structural (Pratt and Schlaefer). The included variables are 
designed to purge the data of their effects so that the impact 
of deregulation could be measured more appropriately. 
l=PRICES OF MATERIALS AND HAGES 
2o:HATERIALS PRICES, WAGES AND fUEL 
interaction term (DSLOPE) measure the average effect of 
deregulation on the study region's price spreads. Because 
there is interest in knowing whether the effect of deregu-
lation was similar across all hinterland regions , two addi-
tional types of interaction terms were added. These terms 
measure the differential effect of deregulation on each re-
gion by allowing each region's slope and intercept values 
to shift relative to the average for all regions. The inter-
cept shifters are generated by multiplying the region and 
the deregulation dummy variables, while the slope shif-
ters are created by multiplying the region dummy with 
the deregulation dummy and the time trend variable. If 
these estimated coefficients are significant, the notion 
that deregulation had a differential impact on the various 
regions will be supported. The analysis showed deregula-
tion to have an unequal effect among regions. In particu-
lar, the price spread in northwest Kansas (KSNW) and the 
three Texas regions (TXTRI, TXNOC, TXSOL) showed an 
additional narrowing as a result of deregulation. This im-
plies deregulation led to above-average rate declines in 
these regions. 
The notion that deregulation may have had an unequal 
effect over time was tested by augmenting the model 
(Table 2) with several variables. The DSLOPE and 
DINTER variables measuring the average effect of dere-
gulation over the 1981-85 period, but by adding year slope 
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Figure 8. Monthly trips per Grain Rail Car, 1976-1985. 
and intercept shifters , the hypotheses that deregulation 
had a differential effect over time may be tested. Introduc-
tion of year dummy variables (1981-85) facilitates measur-
ing of yearly changes in intercept values while introduced 
interaction terms (DSLOPE x year dummy variables) 
measure changes in slope. The results show deregulation 
did not have a uniform effect over time. In particular, in 
1982, and to a lesser extent in 1983, there were increased 
narrowings in the geographic price spread. Supporting 
evidence regarding the temporal effects of deregulation 
was revealed by removing the DSLOPE and DINTER 
variables from the augmented model but allowing the 
year intercept and slope variables to remain. This model 
measures the effect of deregulation in each year during 
the 1981-85 period. The analysis shows most year vari-
ables to be Significant at the I percent level with the great-
est narrowing in price spread to have been in 1982 and 
1983, with lesser impacts in 1984, 1981, and 1985. 
Conceptually, some variables may have had a differing 
effect on rail rates and price spreads during the pre- and 
post-Staggers era, and through further analysis of these 
variables additional insight regarding the effects of dereg-
ulation may be gained . As an example , railroads may have 
an opportunity to adjust labor input because of deregula-
tion , in which case labor may have affected the price 
12 
spread differently during the pre- and post-Staggers 
period. In addition , there may be interest in knowing 
whether railroad rates have become increasingly sensitive 
to demand as a result of deregulation . To test notions re-
garding the differential impact of selected variables on 
pre- and post-deregulation price spreads , interaction 
terms were created and added to the model. 
The deregulated time period (1981-present) has been 
characterized by weak export demand, and it has been ar-
gued that a resurgence in this demand will lead to sub-
stantial increases in rail rates. To test the notion that rail-
road rates have become increasingly sensitive to demand 
during the post-Staggers era, attention was focused on the 
monthly export level variable (EXPD) and an interaction 
term (EXPD X DINTER). Both variables were included 
in a reestimated model and found to be statistically signif-
icant. Based on these variables' estimated coefficients , 
elasticities that measure the responsiveness of price 
spread to monthly export levels were calculated . Results 
indicate an equally insensitive relationship between price 
spreads and export levels during the pre- and post-Staggers 
periods. The estimated pre-Staggers elasticity coefficient 
was .07 while the post-Staggers coefficient was estimated 
to be .06. This outcome offers no support to the notion 
that increasing export levels or demand would lead to dra-
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Figure 9. Monthly index of unutilized grain storage capacity (Kansas). 
matic and substantial rail rate increases. 
Analysis was attempted with the labor cost; fuel cost, 
rail cost, and rail car utilization variables to determine 
whether these variables had a differing effect on the price 
spread during the pre- and post-Staggers era. This was ac-
complished by introducing interaction terms. However, 
only the rail cost index and its associated interaction term 
were found statistically significant. At the means, the pre-
and post-Staggers rail cost elasticities were estimated to 
be 1.31 and 0.2, respectively. This outcome shows a dra-
matic decline in the sensitivity of rail rates to changing rail 
costs in the post-Staggers period. The pre-Staggers study 
period was characterized by rising costs. Historically, the 
ICC authorized universal rate increases that were cost-
based, thus the extreme sensitivity of rates to costs before 
deregulation. The insensitivity of rates to costs during the 
deregulated perio9 was probably due to several factors. 
In part, because of increased productivity during the de-
regulated period, rate structures may have been less re-
sponsive to changing costs, and increased interrailroad 
competition may have made railroads reluctant to pass on 
increased costs to shippers. Others argue that railroads 
have increasingly tended to base rates on demand-related 
factors rather than costs during the post-Staggers period, 
thus the insensitivity between rates and costs. This argu-
ment, however, would seem to hold little credence in 
view of the earlier finding regarding the insensitivity be-
tween rates and export levels or demand. 
There is evidence that railroad productivity may have 
increased during the post-Staggers era and subsequently 
helped foster rate reductions and reduced the respon-
sivenss of rates to changing input costs. A stratified ran-
dom sample of rail waybills drawn from the ICC Waybill 
Statistics show unit train use spread rapidly on the Plains 
region export routes in the early 1980s, especially be-
tween 1982 and 1984. In particular, in the 1981-82 period, 
about 44 percent of Kansas' export grain shipments were 
carried by unit trains; by 1984, the unit train share had 
increased to 85 percent (MacDonald). Klindworth et al. 
indicate the single-car rate system in Kansas was replaced 
in the early 1980s by a system of differential single-car, 
multiple-car, and unit-train rates. This has important im-
plications since large shipment size lowers railroads' per 
bushel rail costs. Typically, unit-train rates are 20 percent 
to 30 percent below corrresponding single-car rates, and 
confidential contract rates may be still lower. Therefore, 
the spread of multiple car and unit train movements may 
have placed downward pressure on rail rates in the Plains 
region. 
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Figure 10. Monthly Illinois River barge rates to Gulf, 1976-1985. 
The results provide strong evidence that the Staggers 
Rail Act of 1980 led to a restructuring of export grain rates. 
There appears to have been a substantial decline in export 
rail rates linking Central and South Plains wheat-produc-
ing regions with Gulf ports whereas deregulation seems 
to have had little or no effect on the Corn Belt's export 
rates. Furthermore, the declining rates do not seem in 
large part attributable to the diminished foreign demand 
for U. S. grain or shifts in the farm-level or marketing ser-
vices supply functions. 
Plausibility and Implications of Results 
To some extent, these findings are at variance with ear-
lier predictions. It was generally held that the transporta-
tion environment in the Corn Belt would promote com-
petition and lower rates, whereas most Plains transporta-
tion corridors are dominated by a few rail carriers, hence 
an oligopolistic market structure that would dampen 
price (rate) competition. 
Although the results of this study were somewhat unex-
pected, there is supporting evidence. The findings of 
Sorenson, et al. in Kansas and Adam, et al. in Nebraska 
support the Plains model results that deregulation led to 
a substantial decline in rates. Hauser collected published 
14 
rail rates on various export-corn transportation corridors 
over the 1978-83 period and found rates to modestly in-
crease ($. 02) and decrease ($.02-$ .08) in relatively small 
increments after deregulation. Furthermore, collected 
tariff rates on both Plains and Corn Belt transportation cor-
ridors generally support the models' findings (Appendix B). 
Several provisions of the Staggers Act were designed to 
create a competitive railroad pricing behavior. First, the 
Staggers Act ended rate bureaus' anti-trust immmunity 
and subsequently removed the railroads' ability to jointly 
set rates. Some argue that rate bureaus permitted rail-
roads to act as a cartel when setting rates. If rate bureaus 
did serve" as cartels in the pre-Staggers era and the ICC 
did not adhere to the value-of-service pricing theory, 
rates in those grain surplus regions with little intermodal 
competition (Plains) would tend to be relatively high, 
whereas areas with strong intermodal competition (Corn 
Belt) would have comparatively low rail rates. Second, 
the Staggers Act attempted to further enhance the com-
petitive transportation environment through provisions 
that facilitated the widespread use of contracting. Be-
cause of the confidential nature of contracts, rate infor-
mation does not become public. As a result, competing 
railroads are denied essential information for tacit price-
setting, a form of price-making that may evolve in lieu of 
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Figure 11. Estimated rail rate trend during the 
Pre- and Post-Staggers Period. 
formal arrangements historically offered through rate 
bureaus. 
In view of the regulatory modifications offered by Stag-
gers and notions regarding the ICC's pre-Staggers be-
havior, the explanation for the observed results come into 
perspective. Apparently, rate bureaus were allowed to 
function as a cartel, and the ICC permitted railroads to 
offer rates whose upper bound was determined by com-
petitive forces (i.e., the value-of-service pricing theory 
had no role in the pre-Staggers export-grain rate struc-
ture). In this case , the lack of intermodal competition in 
the Plains led to high rates, whereas the strong inter-
modal competition in the Corn Belt created relatively low 
rates. With the passage of Staggers , interrailroad compe-
tition was apparently facilitated. And in the Plains region , 
which had little intermodal competition and the highest 
pre-Staggers rates, there was a substantial opportunity for 
rates to decline because of competitive pricing behavior. 
Accordingly, rates declined precipitously in the Plains 
compared with the Corn Belt, where rates declined mod-
estly or not at all. Strong water competition in the Corn 
Belt had kept pre-Staggers rail rates low, limiting the op-
portunity for rate reductions. Thus , deregulation had an 
uneven effect on the Plains and Corn Belt regions' export-
grain rate structures. 
Several implications of the results seem important. 
First, there is strong evidence that ICC rail regulation 
was not aimed at protecting agricultural shippers. Rather, 
evidence supports the notion that rail regulation served 
to allow cartel pricing (Hilton). Rates have fallen in the 
Plains region where a cartel would have been effective , 
but in the Corn Belt, where intermodal competition 
would have made for a less effective cartel, rates have de-
clined little or not at all. Second, this study's findings 
seem to support''Levin's earlier work. Levin showed the 
social desirability of deregulation to be closely related to 
the existence of interrailroad competition. It seems that 
removing the immunity of rate bureaus and contracting 
have generated interrailroad and possibly geographic 
competition in those regions of the United States where 
railroads have historically enjoyed monopolistic power 
and relatively high rates. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study evaluates the effect of deregulation on ex-
port grain rates. Because of deregulation , much of the ex-
port grain moves under contract rather than published 
tariff rates , making direct rate measurement impossible. 
Therefore, to evaluate the effect of deregulation , price 
spreads between port and associated hinterland regions 
were analyzed. This involved estimating covariance models 
that include price spreads as the dependent variable, inde-
pendent variables that control for shifts in demand and sup-
ply functions, region and time dummies, and a dummy and 
interaction term to isolate the effect of deregulation. 
Study results show deregulation led to a substantial de-
cline in wheat export rates but had no or little impact on 
corn export rates. During the pre-Staggers era, rate 
bureaus facilitated the operation of rate-fixing cartels and , 
as a result , Plains region rates were generally high be-
cause oflimited intermodal competition. Apparently, pas-
sage of the Staggers Rail Act removed rate bureaus' cartel-
like features , and, in spite of the few operating rail com-
panies on most wheat transportation corridors , interrail-
road competition developed. As a result of the historically 
high rates in the Plains region, and with the advent of in-
terrailroad competition, rail rates declined. In contrast , 
there has been little decline in corn export rates because 
the region's railroads have historically experienced strong 
intermodal competition from low-cost water transporta-
tion. Accordingly, there has been little opportunity for 
railroads to reduce Corn Belt rates, even though intra-
modal competition has been made to exist. 
Because of the rather short post-Staggers' period of ob-
servation, it is difficult to know whether railroads will be-
have in the long run as they have in the short run. Regard-
less , it is essential that agriculture carefully evaluate pro-
posed modifications to Staggers, especially those that deal 
with contracting and rate bureaus. Also of great impor-
tance is the policy that the ICC adopts toward rail and rail-
barge mergers. The large number of merger applications 
will undoubtedly produce a major restructuring of the 
U.S. railroad network. It is important that Congress and 
the ICC play a constructive role in preserving the ob-
served interrailroad competition. 
Acknowledgments 
The authors are indebted to Hector Viscencio-Brambila 
and Ronald Rice for their substantial contribution to this 
research effort. This work was partially supported by 
USDA-ERS, Agreement No. 58-3523-4-00308. Review 
comments by Wesley Peterson , Don Farris , and Mickey 
Paggi are appreciated. 
Fuller and Bessler are professors in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at Texas A&M University. 
Wohlgenant, former associate professor at Texas A&M 
University, is an associate professor in the Department of 
Economics at North Carolina State University. Mac-
Donald is an economist with USDA-ERS. 
15 
References 
1. Adam, Brian G., and Dale G. Anderson , "Implica-
tions of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 on Level and 
Variability of Country Elevator Price Bids." Trans-
portation Research Forum 26(1985): 357-363. 
2. Association of American Railroads. The Grain Book 
1986. Washington, D .C.: Information and Public Af-
fairs Department, 1987. 
3. Association of American Railroads. Railroads Cost 
Recovery Index, Washington, D.C.: Information and 
Public Affairs Department, various issues 1979-1986. 
4. Babcock, Michael W., L. Orlo Sorenson, Ming H. 
Chow, and Keith Klindworth, "Impact of the Stag-
gers Rail Act on Agriculture: A Kansas Study," Trans-
portation Research Forum 26(1985): 364-372. 
5. Friedlaender, Ann F. The Dilemma of Freight Trans-
port Regulation. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1969. 
6. Friedlaender, Ann F., and Richard H. Spady. Freight 
Transport Regulation: Equity, Efficiency, and Com-
petition in the Rail and Trucking Industries. Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981. 
7. Fruin, Jerry E. "Impacts on Agriculture of Deregulat-
ing the Transportation System." Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 
63(1981): 923-925. 
8. Fuller, Stephen W., Larry Makus, and Merritt 
Taylor. "Effect of Railroad Deregulation on Export-
Grain Rates." N. Cent. J. Agr. Econ. 5(1983): 51-63. 
9. Hauser, Robert J . "Regional Measures of Competi-
tion in the u.S. Inland Transport Industry for Export 
Grain, 1978-1983." Unpublished final report to U.S. 
Department of Transportation , University of Illinois , 
1986. 
10. Hill , Lowell D., MackN. Leath,andStephenW. Ful-
ler. Corn Movements in the United States. Urbana: Il-
linois Agricultural Experiment Station, January 1977. 
11. Hilton , George W. "The Basic Behavior of Regulatory 
Commissions." American Economic Review Papers 
and Proceedings 62(1972): 47-54. 
12. Illinois Department of Agriculture, Division of Mark-
eting. "Transportation Situation." Springfield, IL, 
various issues 1976-1985. 
13. International Monetary Fund. International Finan-
cial Statistics. Washington , D.C.: Monthly Summary 
Statistics , various issues 1976-1985. 
14. Keeler, Theodore E. Railroads, Freight , and Public 
Policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1983. 
15. Klindworth, Keith A. , L. Orlo Sorenson, Michael W. 
Babcock, and Ming H. Chow, Impacts of Rail Dere-
gulation on the Marketing of Kansas Wheat. Washing-
ton , D.C.: U.S. Depaltment of Agriculture, Office of 
Transportation, 1985. 
16. Koo, Won W. "Impacts on Agriculture of Deregulat-
ing the Transportation System: Comment." Amer. J. 
Agr. Econ. 65(1983): 187- 189. 
17. Leath , Mack D. , Lowell D. Hill , and Stephen W. 
Fuller. Wheat Movements in the United States. U r-
bana: Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulle-
tin 767, January 1981. 
18. Levin, Richard C. "Railroad Rates, Profitability, and 
Welfare Under Deregulation," Bell]. Econ. l2(1981): 
1-26. 
19. MacDonald, James. "Multicar Export Grain Ship-
ments, 1982-1984." Unpublished paper, USDA, 1986. 
20. Meyer, John R., Merton J. Peck, Johp. Stenason, and 
Charles Zwick, The Economics of Competition in the 
Transportation Industries. Cam bridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1959. 
21. Posner, Richard A. "Taxation by Regulation." Bell J. 
Econ. 2(1971): 22-50. 
22. Pratt, J.W., and Robert Schlaefer, "On the Nature 
and Discovery of Structure." J. Amer. Stat. Assn. 
79(1984): 9-28. 
23. Sorenson, L. Orlo. "Some Impacts of Rail Regulatory 
Changes on Grain Industries." Amer. J. of Agri. 
Econ. 66(1984): 645-650. 
24. Sorenson, L. Orlo , Dale G. Anderson, and David C. 
Nelson. Railroad Rate Discrimination: Applications 
to Great Plains Agriculture. Manhattan: Kansas Agri-
cultural Experiment Station Publication No. 165, 
1973. 
25. Spann, Robert M. , and Edward W. Erickson. "The 
Economics of Railroading: The Beginning of Carteli-
zation and Regulation." Bell J. Econ. l (Autumn 1970): 
227-244. 
26. U.S. Department of Agriculture , Agricultural Mark-
eting Service. "Grain and Feed Market News. 
Washington, D . C., various issues 1976-1985a. 
27. U. S. Department of Agriculture , Economic Research 
Service. "Wheat Situation and Outlook." 
Washington, D. C., various issues 1976-1985b. 
28. U.S. Department of Agriculture , Statistical Report-
ing Service. "Agricultural Statistics." Washington, 
D .C., various issues 1976- 1985c. 
29. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Statistical Report-
ing Service, Crop Reporting Board. "Grain Stocks." 
Washington , D. C., various issues 1976-1985d. 
APPENDIX A 
Table AI. Mean, Minimum, and Maximum Values of 
Variables Included in the Plains and Corn Belt Regres-
sion Equations 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
- - -- - - - - -- -- - --- Plains Model -- --- --- - --- ---
PSPD .51 .19 .95 
FSUP 1101.96 829.90 1243.60 
EXPD 48180.34 19129.00 113266.00 
T-BILL 8.91 4.35 16.3 
EXPECT .44 -3.28 6.02 
WAGE 1 103.39 96.55 113.06 
RUI 1.42 1.10 1.74 
STOR .57 .32 .88 
- --- ------------- Corn Belt - -- --- - -- - - -- ----
PSPD1 .28 -.06 .65 
EXPD 162934.00 73776.00 256844.00 
FSUP 1007.91 340.91 1731.25 
STOR .56 .23 .88 
BRATI 
.15 .07 .40 
IValues deflated with wholesale price index (1975 = 100). 
Table A2. Simple Correlation Coefficients for Variables Included in Plains Model 
PSPD EXPD FSUP WAGE T-BILL EXPECT RUI STOR 
PSPD 1.00 .091 -.422 -.440 .099 .264 .365 - .158 (. 0005) (.0001) (. 0001) (. 0002) (. 0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
EXPD 1.00 .212 .059 .492 -.038 .193 .025 (. 0001) (. 0246) (. 0001) (.1430) (. 0001) (. 3526) 
FSUP 1.00 .166 .306 -.239 -.287 - .043 (. 0001) (. 0001) (. 0001) (.0001) (.8018) 
WAGE 1.00 -.335 - .303 - .247 -.078 (.0001) (.0001) (. 0142) (. 0001) 
T-BILL 1.00 .092 -.012 - .040 (. 0206) (. 0001) (. 1279) 
EXPECT 1.00 .258 - .033 (.0001) (. 2726) 
RUI 1.00 .202 (.1900) 
STOR 1.00 
Values in parenthesis represent probability that simple correlation coeffici ent is zero . 
17 
Table A3. Simple Correlation Coefficients for Variables Included in Corn Belt Model 
PSPD EXPD FSUP WAGE T-BILL EXPECT RUI STOR BRAT 
PSPD 1.00 .223 .267 - .242 -.154 .250 .378 - .257 .581 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (. 0001) (. 0001) (. 0001) 
EXPD 1.00 .071 - .241 .443 .168 .320 - .07t .439 (.0004) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (. 0003) (.0001) 
FSUP 1.00 -.063 .051 .045 -.077 - .285 - .031 (.0014) (. 0105) (. 0244) (.0001) (.0001) (.0724) 
WAGE 1.00 -.335 -.303 -.248 .196 - .172 (. 0001) (.0001) (.0001) (. 0001) (. 0001) 
T-BILL 1.00 .092 -.012 -.023 .127 (.0001) (.5528) (. 0001) (.0001) 
EXPECT 1.00 .258 - .153 .376 (.0001) (.0014) (.0001) 
RUI 1.00 .125 .589 (. 0001) (. 0001) 
STOR 1.00 .003 (.0001) 
BRAT 1.00 
Values in parenthesis represent probability that simple correlation coeffi cient is zero . 
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APPENDIXB 
Table BI. Export Rate Linking Topeka, KS, with Houston, TX, 1976-1983 
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Table B2. Export Rate Linking Hutchinson, KS, with Houston, TX, 1976-1983 
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Table B3. Export Rate Linking Salina, KS, with Beaumont, TX, 1976-1983 
12 31S ISO 95 108 
MONTH 
21 
22 
S 
I 
8 
U 
5 
H 
E 
1.2 
1.0 
O.lI 
L o.s 
0.2 
Table B4. Export Rate Linking Wichita, KS, with Galveston, TX, 1976-1983 
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Table B5. Export Rate Linking Toledo, OH, with Baltimore, MD, 1976-1983 
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Table B6. E~port Rate Linking Des Moines, lA, with New Orleans, LA, 1976-1983 
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Table B7, Export Rate Linking Esterville, lA, with Houston, TX, 1976-1983 
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Table B8. Export Rate Linking Indianapolis, IN, with Baltimore, MD, 1976-1983 
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Table B9. Export Rate Linking Champaign, IL, with Philadelphia, PA, 1976-1983 
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